The Partisan Divide (Part Two)

Decades from now, after most of us are long dead, a new generation of historians will find itself reshuffling the ranks of America’s best and worst presidents. This is a periodic ritual for scholars, who re-evaluate rankings as new research is devoted to older presidents and newer presidents leave office with a legacy yet to be determined. Since we don’t know what presidents will come after Obama or how talented they will actually be, we cannot say for certain that George W. Bush will be considered the worst or even one of the worst American presidents. But, based on what many historians are already saying about Bush II, it is not unreasonable to assume that he may very well get that dishonor, all other things remaining equal.

The reason is that as president George W. Bush possessed the same liabilities of many of those now considered America’s worst leaders, while at the same time possessing few of their positive attributes. Ulysses S. Grant, one of the most revered generals in American history, served two terms as president and is ranked near the bottom of the list because he was so openly tolerant of corruption in his own administration. Warren G. Harding allowed his cronies to loot the country and run his administration. Richard Nixon abused the power of the executive office. Jimmy Carter found himself completely in over his head, faced with problems that he and his administration were simply too incompetent and too impotent to do anything about. Lyndon Johnson embroiled the United States in a senseless and unwinnable foreign war (in all fairness, Johnson rarely makes the list of the ten worst, but he could consistently have been ranked among the ten best if it wasn’t for Vietnam).

Each of these men’s mistakes were also made by President Bush, but unlike many of these men Bush’s presidency has no visibly redeeming characteristics that revisionist historians are likely to latch onto. Unlike Nixon, Bush does not have any great diplomatic victories to buoy his record like the opening of Red China. Unlike Johnson, Bush does not have a Great Society program or landmark civil rights legislation. Nor does Bush’s past or probable future offer any benefits to his legacy. Unlike Grant he has had no brilliant military career to save his reputation, and unlike Carter it’s unlikely that Bush will have a successful and admired post-presidency.

A healthy, mature democratic system can sometimes – usually by accident – produce a leader as unfit to rule as George W. Bush was. But only in a system in deep crisis can a man like Bush hold high office as long as he was able to. No single man has done more to lay the foundation for a second American Civil War than Bush has, and if such a war does come to pass those future historians working on the lists of best and worst presidents will surely place much of the blame for it on his shoulders, just as they place much of the blame for the original American Civil War on presidents that came before Abraham Lincoln.

What Bush did was to open the door for political violence – from both liberals and conservatives – to escape into American society. He did this by continuing what the GOP had started with the 1994 mid-term elections, which brought Republican dominance to both houses of Congress. Remember my last post, where I explained how 1994 marked a shift in conservative culture where power was transferred from the old conservative elites (who recognized the legitimacy of the liberal elites as political actors) to a new generation that did not recognize Bill Clinton as legitimate, and also did not recognize the liberal elites as legitimate governing partners.

After a deceivingly amiable period of bipartisanship early in his presidency (mostly pursued in order to move his massive tax cuts through Congress), the White House and GOP settled into the now familiar political strategy of ruling through division. The master brain behind this was, of course, Karl Rove, and his ruthless skill came very near to tearing apart the social fabric of the nation. The Rove strategy threw out the idea that successful governance required a broad electoral mandate, substituting it for a tyranny of the slimmest majority. President Bush did not need to win huge victories in the popular vote and Electoral College (he didn’t even need to win the popular vote, as the 2000 election demonstrated) to govern and advance his agenda. Nor did Congress necessarily need a huge GOP majority. They could get by with a majority that would allow legislation to be passed on a party line vote (except when the pesky Democrats filibustered). Large electoral victories were nice to have but not required.

The Rove strategy deliberately made Americans perceive themselves as existing in one of two distinctive groups. If you were a conservative, you were made to feel like you were in a struggle of Christianity versus godless heathenism, of patriot versus cowardly appeaser, of American versus foreign invaders and threats, of the pure and divine heartland versus the evil and godless cities on the east and west coasts. If you were a liberal you felt like you were in struggle of enlightenment versus religious fanaticism, of patriot versus militarist, of social harmony versus racism and xenophobia, and of big city progressiveness versus small town intolerance.

We all know that conservatives bought into this mentality (it first reached political maturity with the 1994 election) in increasing numbers through the Bush years, and liberals deride them for it. What liberals will not admit is that they bought into it as well because they came to believe the bullshit about there really being two Americas. They began to believe that “red state” conservative voters really were a bunch of redneck, inbred Jesus freaks – exactly as Rove intended. Their derision therefore reinforced the original message that liberals from the coasts looked down on conservative, religious small towners.

At the same time, the conservative elites themselves were continuing to rob the liberal elites of their legitimacy. There is no better illustration of this than the way that the media was used against Democrats. Conservative media outlets (books, radio and Fox News on television) went on the attack, and the 2002 mid-term elections were particularly ugly as the right wing attacked on national security issues. Democrats had not exactly been obstructionists when it came to the War on Terror. They had overwhelmingly supported the Afghan War. Many had voted for the PATRIOT Act. Many still were willing to support the upcoming Iraq War. This did not matter to Karl Rove’s political apparatus, and the Democrats became the recipients of truly vicious political attacks, and received an electoral pounding that they still haven’t recovered from psychologically.

Nations that slip into revolution and civil war usually do so in one of two ways. In the first way there is a broad popular uprising against the ruling elites. In the second way the ruling elites turn on each other, fracturing the country as happened in both the American Revolution and the first American Civil War. It should worry us then that both trends seem to be occurring in modern America. A large number of conservatives no longer view liberals as legitimate political actors, and a large number of liberals no longer view conservatives as legitimate political actors. At the same time, conservative and liberal elites are turning against each other as well.

The coming violence will likely be initiated by the right wing of American politics, but George W. Bush’s poisonous legacy cuts both ways. Had John McCain won the presidency there is little doubt in my mind that I would still be writing this blog, sounding alarm bells about left wing militarism instead of right wing fascism.